Frequency and intensity of successful malicious exploits of online data call for a pooling of information between impacted parties
When hackers obtain otherwise legitimate credentials to online sites and the data repositories they contain, the likelihood of success for their efforts to depart with data they do not own is much greater — perhaps unstoppable. Therefore it makes sense for parties impacted by these attacks to pool their information so a new level of defense can be promptly implemented against further successful exploits with the same credentials.
Unfortunately this is the condition apparently in place in March 2015. On Sunday, March 29, 2015 the online edition of the Wall Street Journal ran a story written by the Associated Press titled Some British Airways Frequent-Flier Accounts Hacked. Notable in the article is mention of what appears to be the method the hackers used to access the data: “The breach apparently was the result of a third party using information obtained elsewhere on the Internet”.
Then, through what looks like a brute force method of simply trying credential set after credential set against the access control method at the perimeter of the British Airways web site, the hackers eventually succeeded in their effort. Tellingly, the writers from the Associated Press note this attack is, apparently, the fourth such recent attempt. The other attempts compromised data owned by the “Hilton and Starwood” hotel brands and “United and American airlines”.
It is very hard to defend a data repository against requests for access based on legitimate credentials. Sure processes can be implemented to detect brute force access methods and to deny access — even to holders of legitimate credentials — when they are presented within the context of a brute force attack. But what if the “automated process” mentioned by the Associated Press amounted to a substantially more sophisticated tactic than a rapid, repeated completion of an online site access form? It would be much harder to detect a brute force attack should it transpire over days, or even weeks.
Regardless of how one argues data owners should defend themselves against these types of attacks, the substantial value of implementing data consortiums — literally groups pooling data about attacks — as a defense method should pass muster. One can argue law enforcement agencies already provide this type of knowledge “beyond the wall” and should be able to play this role. But there is another aspect to the potential of a data consortium for online data security, a similar opportunity to the concept of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) as it has been applied to efforts to implement Operational Risk Management (ORM) solutions for global financial businesses. This application of a data consortium will not fall within the purview of a decision to look to law enforcement for “environmentally relevant” data about similar data security breaches. I have some experience with ORM solutions including KRIs and would be interested to speak with readers with an interest in hearing further about this notion. Please contact me to discuss.
Ira Michael Blonder
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